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ELIMINATING THE PROTECTIONIST FREE 
RIDE: THE NEED FOR COST 
REDISTRIBUTION IN ANTIDUMPING 
CASES 
Elizabeth L. Gunn*
Abstract: U.S. antidumping laws exist so that domestic markets can 
protect themselves against foreign goods sold in the United States at less 
than fair market value. In an antidumping case, after the initial petition is 
ªled, all costs of investigation and determination fall on the U.S. 
government. Those companies and markets alleged of dumping, 
however, must pay for their own defense, diverting money from industry 
development to defense of their actions. A majority of the antidumping 
cases ªled result in a de minimis or zero antidumping margin, but the costs 
of achieving such a result weigh heavily on the accused market. This Note 
explores the application and results of U.S. antidumping laws on U.S. and 
foreign companies and the distribution of costs in their application. 
Using the Salmon Case from Chile as an example, it argues that in order 
to eliminate frivolous and protectionist antidumping actions, the 
petitioners should bear the costs of investigation and discovery instead of 
the government. 
Introduction 
 Will Rogers once observed that “if the other fellow sells cheaper 
than you, it is called ‘dumping.’ Course, if you sell cheaper than him, 
that’s ‘mass production.’”1 Dumping is a form of international price 
discrimination2 that occurs when internationally traded goods are 
sold at less than fair market value (LTFV).3 If a good is dumped into a 
                                                                                                                      
* Elizabeth L. Gunn is the Solicitations & Symposium Editor of the Boston College Inter-
national & Comparative Law Review. 
1 See BrainyQuote, Will Rogers Quotes, at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/ 
w/willrogers102578.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
2 See House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong., Overview and Compilation 
of U.S. Trade Statutes 100 (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://frwebgate.access. 
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_ways_and_means_committee_prints&docid=f:87657. 
pdf. 
3 See Robert W. McGee & Yeomin Yoon, Technical Flaws in the Application of the U.S. Anti-
dumping Law: The Experience of U.S.-Korean Trade, 15 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 259, 260 (1994). 
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country’s market it can harm that market by driving domestic com-
petitors out of business.4 Antidumping (AD) laws, which have been 
referred to as domestic industry’s “Weapon of Choice for Protec-
tion,”5 allow for a legal response by the domestic government and in-
dustry to protect their businesses.6 At the same time, the laws allow 
for many protectionist actions.7
 In the United States, antidumping cases are jointly heard by the 
Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC).8 The majority of AD cases are initiated by peti-
tions from “interested parties”9 and are subsequently investigated, de-
cided, and paid for by the DOC and ITC.10 The petitioner’s only costs 
are the expenses incurred in the preparation of the petition and any 
additional information they choose to provide, whereas the accused 
companies must pay for all their defense costs, including translation 
of all documents to and from English.11
 In the eyes of domestic companies, AD laws effectively protect 
and guard against lower priced foreign competitors.12 But for foreign 
companies, especially those in developing industries and economies, 
such laws can create huge ªnancial and legal burdens once a case 
against them is initiated.13 An example of the extreme social and eco-
nomic effects an AD case can have on a developing economy are the 
accusations the Coalition for Fair Atlantic Salmon Trade (FAST) pre-
sented against the Association of Chilean Salmon and Trout Produc-
ers (Association) (the Salmon Case).14
 This Note explores the impact of U.S. antidumping cases on for-
eign markets and companies. Part I describes the current U.S. AD law 
as well as the companies and industries involved in the Salmon Case. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Christopher Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of Anti-
Dumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus 49, 53 (1997). 
5 Id. 
6 McGee & Yoon, supra note 3, at 260; see Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Anti-
dumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 491, 495–96 (1993). 
7 See id. 
8 See Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 101, 102. 
9 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1) (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 207.10(a) (2003). In order for the case 
not to be terminated, the interested party must be representative of the industry as a 
whole. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4). 
10 See McGee, supra note 6, at 547. 
11 See id. at 496, 536. 
12 See McGee & Yoon, supra note 3, at 260. Whether those competitors actually are 
dumping or not is a separate consideration. See id. 
13 See McGee, supra note 6, at 497–98. 
14 See Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 62 Fed. Reg. 37027 (Dep’t of Commerce July 
10, 1997) (initiation). 
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Part II examines how an AD case is decided, using the Salmon Case as 
an example, and compares the results of the Salmon Case to other 
dumping cases. Part III argues that in order to avoid negative and po-
tentially protectionist effects caused by AD cases, petitioners, as op-
posed to the government, should be responsible for the costs in-
curred during the investigation and evaluation of their claims. 
Holding petitioners accountable for the costs of their cases will deter 
companies from ªling petitions intended to merely use AD laws as a 
means of reducing foreign competition. 
I. Background 
A. History of U.S. Antidumping Laws 
 Antidumping laws emerged in the United States after World War I, 
with present day laws based on the Antidumping Act of 1921.15 Since 
their inception, AD laws have gone through a series of amendments; 
the most recent of which were adopted by Congress as part of the 
United States’ participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO).16 
The most signiªcant amendment from the WTO Uruguay Round 
Agreements is a sunset provision which requires that, after ªve years, 
the AD tariff level must be terminated unless the evaluating authority 
determines that there would likely be a continuation or recurrence of 
dumping.17 Today, the result of a negative AD determination is the as-
sessment of a dumping margin (a company speciªc tariff placed on the 
type goods found to be sold under LTFV in the United States) against 
the foreign exporter.18 In light of the strict tariff agreements under the 
WTO, AD tariffs are one of the last and “most viable [bases] for impos-
ing or preserving protective duties”.19
 In the United States, the evaluating authorities of AD cases are 
the DOC and ITC.20 Between 1990 and 2000, the DOC and ITC heard 
over 440 antidumping cases, terminating the investigation in 238 
cases for lack of information or ªnding no material injury or dump-
                                                                                                                      
15 See Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 101. 
16 See id. at 102. 
17 19 U.S.C. §§ 1675(c), 1657a (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 207.60 (2003); Ways and Means, 
supra note 2, at 112. 
18 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c) (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 351.211–.212. 
19 Corr, supra note 4, at 53. 
20 See Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 101, 102. 
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ing.21 In other words, over half of the AD cases brought between 1990 
and 2000 were against companies who were not harming U.S. indus-
tries and were selling goods at a fair market value.22
B. Chilean Economy—Salmon’s Role 
 Traditionally, Chile has been known for its exportation of cop-
per.23 Today, copper still plays a large role in the Chilean economy, but 
the country’s position on the world market has diversiªed.24 Part of this 
diversiªcation is the growth of its ªshing sector, including the export of 
fresh and chilled Atlantic Salmon.25 This growth was supported by the 
1976 creation of the Ofªce of the Sub-secretary of Fishing, part of the 
Chilean Ministry of Economics and Energy.26 The Sub-secretary is re-
sponsible for proposing and supporting legislation which pertains to 
the growth of ªshing in Chile, as well as other industry support.27
 Since 1990, the ªshing industry has accounted for between 10% 
and 13% of Chilean exports, and that percentage continues to grow.28 
In 2002, the United States was the destination for 26.5% of Chile’s 
ªsh exports, second only to Japan.29 The main ªshing product ex-
ported to the United States from Chile is fresh and chilled Atlantic 
Salmon.30 These exports accounted for 17.1% (or approximately $492 
                                                                                                                      
21 See United States International Trade Commission, Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Duty Handbook (10th ed. 2002), available at ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/re 
ports/studies/PUB3566.PDF [hereinafter USITC Handbook]. 
22 See id. 
23 See, e.g., Consulado General de Chile en Nueva York, History, available at www.chileny. 
com/02history.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
24 See generally Chile-info.com: The Chilean Marketplace, Products, at http://206.49. 
217.77/servlet/NavigationServlet (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
25 See generally id.; see also Chile-info.com, Product Channels, Seafood, at http://206. 
 49.217.77/servlet/NavigationServlet?page=product_channel&id_product_channel=57A47 
0900000000100ADD4FB7C645424 (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
26 See Subsecretaría de Pesca, Quienes Somos, at www.subpesca.cl/quienes.htm. 
27 See id. 
28 See Ofªce of the Sub-secretary of Fishing of Chile, Chilean Fishing Sector 
2002 Summary § 2, available at www.subpesca.cl/sector_r_en.htm [hereinafter Sub-
secretary of Fishing Summary]. 
29 Id. § 4.1. 
30 See id. § 4.2. 
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million)31 of the total value of exported ªsh in 2002, and 91.3% of 
total fresh and chilled Atlantic Salmon exported from Chile.32
 Many of the largest salmon exporters in Chile have business rela-
tionships with foreign investors, including U.S. corporations.33 The 
largest exporters are diverse companies that export over $100 million 
of ªsh products a year,34 while smaller corporations have less than $1 
million of total exports per year.35 The named defendants in the 
Salmon Case were identiªed by the DOC as the ªve produc-
ers/exporters with the greatest export volume between the United 
States and Chile, accounting for slightly less than 50% of the total ex-
ports of Chilean fresh and chilled Atlantic Salmon.36
C. U.S. Salmon Industry 
 The U.S. ªshing industry accounts for 4% of total worldwide ªsh-
ing, but only accounts for 0.5–0.6% of total U.S. GDP.37 Whereas ªsh-
ing is the third largest export from Chile, it is not anywhere near the 
top of the U.S. export list.38 In 2002 the United States exported over 
$3.1 billion worth of edible ªsh, $468 million of which was salmon.39 
All but approximately $24 million of those exports came from the 
                                                                                                                      
31 US Department of Commerce TradeStats Express, HS–03 Fish, Crustaceans & 
Aquatic Invertebrates—Imports from Chile, available at http://ese.export.gov/SCRIPTS/ 
hsrun.exe/Distributed/ITA2003_NATIONAL/MapXtreme.htx;start=HS_newMap (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2004). 
32 Sub-secretary of Fishing Summary, supra note 28, § 4.2. 
33 See, e.g., Pesquera Eicosal Ltda., subsidiary of Stolt Sea Farm, available at www.stolt 
seafarm.com/chile/vision_1.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
34 See e.g., Marine Harvest Chile S.A., available at http://206.49.217.77/servlet/Naviga 
tionServlet?page=ªcha_empresa&id_exporter=13BB2C0800000098005404089A0CA7E1. 
35 See e.g., Mascato Chile S.A., available at http://206.49.217.77/servlet/Navigation 
Servlet?page=ªcha_empresa&id_exporter=13BB2C080000009800540408B7D1FF37 (last vi-
sited Nov. 16, 2004). 
36 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2666 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 
16, 1998) (preliminary determination). 
37 NMFS Fisheries Statistics and Economics Division, Statistical Highlights 
Fisheries of the United States (2002), available at www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/fus/current/ 
hilite2002.pdf [hereinafter NMFS Statistics]; Bureau of Economic Analysis, Industry 
Accounts Data: Gross Domestic Product by Industry, available at http://www.bea. 
gov/bea/dn2/gdpbyind_data.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
38 Compare The World Factbook, Chile: Exports—Commodities, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/ factbook/geos/ci.html#Econ with The World Factbook, United States: Exports—
Commodities, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Econ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2004). 
39 See generally NMFS Statistics, supra note 37; National Marine Fisheries Service 
Fisheries Statistics and Economics Division, available at http://www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/ 
trade/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter NMFS]. 
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New England or the Paciªc regions of the United States.40 Addition-
ally, less than 5% of the salmon exports from those regions were of 
fresh-chilled Atlantic Salmon.41
 The Plaintiffs in the Salmon Case were located either in Maine, 
New Hampshire, or Washington, and as such were found to be repre-
sentative of the New England and Paciªc regions.42 The petitioners 
were found to be representative of 70% of total production of fresh 
Atlantic Salmon produced and sold domestically, thus having to com-
pete with Chilean exports.43
II. Discussion: The U.S. AD Case Process and  
the Salmon Case Example 
A. U.S. Dumping Case Process 
 To begin an antidumping duty investigation, identical petitions 
must be simultaneously ªled with the DOC and the ITC.44 The peti-
tion must include allegations and supporting documentation that the 
named imported goods are (or are likely to be) sold at LTFV in the 
United States and that an industry in the United States is either mate-
rially injured, threatened with material injury, or the establishment of 
an industry is materially retarded.45
 The DOC has created a twenty page form which identiªes all the 
information that must be included to be a complete application.46 
Petitioners are not required to provide any further information after 
the initial petition is ªled, although they have the option to ªle addi-
tional briefs during the investigation process.47
 During the investigation of an antidumping petition, the DOC 
ªrst determines if the good in question is being, or is likely to be, sold 
                                                                                                                      
40 See id. 
41 See id. 
42 See Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 62 Fed. Reg. 37027, 37029 (Dep’t. of Com-
merce July 10, 1997) (initiation). 
43 See id. at 37028. 
44 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(1–2) (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 207.10. 
45 19 U.S.C. § 1673; 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.11, 351.202 (2003); see also International Trade 
Administration Department of Commerce, Petition Format for Requesting Relief 
Under U.S. Antidumping Law, Form ITA-357P, available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/pcp/ 
Sample-AD-Data-Collection-Form-02-20-2004.prdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter 
ITADC PETITION]. 
46 See ITADC Petition, supra note 45; USITC Handbook, supra note 21, at I-3 to -16. 
47 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a (b); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(4)(E). 
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in the United States at LTFV.48 Additionally, the DOC has the burden 
of determining whether or not the petitioners are representative of an 
entire industry.49 Second, the ITC must determine that an industry in 
the United States is materially injured, is threatened with material in-
jury, or that the establishment of an industry could be materially re-
tarded.50 If the DOC determines that LTFV sales exist, and the ITC 
determines that a material injury exists, an antidumping duty is im-
posed on the goods in the amount by which the normal value (as de-
termined by the DOC) exceeds the export price (i.e., U.S. price).51 
During the process of the entire AD case, the DOC issues three de-
terminations52 and the ITC issues two53; if at any point the ITC or 
DOC’s determinations contradict the petitioner’s claims, the investi-
gation is terminated.54
 The investigations of petitioners’ claims by the DOC and ITC in-
clude the use of questionnaires to the parties, site visits, and other data 
accumulation.55 All of the costs of information gathering are paid by 
the U.S. government, while all of the costs of responding to requests for 
information and documents are borne by the respondents.56 There 
may also be hearings before the DOC and/or ITC where testimony and 
arguments can be presented (at the cost of those wishing to be pre-
sent).57 If a country does not completely comply with the DOC and/or 
ITC’s requests for information, then decisions issued will be based on 
the “best information available” to the DOC and ITC at the time.58 
Normally the “best information available” is the information from the 
initial petition and therefore is information biased against the defen-
dant country.59 More drastically, if a country refuses to comply with the 
requests, the DOC interprets that refusal as a confession of guilt and 
                                                                                                                      
48 19 U.S.C. § 1637b(a) (1999); Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 102. 
49 19 U.S.C. § 1637a(c)(4) (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 351.203 (2003). 
50 19 U.S.C. § 1637b(a); 19 C.F.R. § 351.205 (2003); Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 
102. 
51 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (1999); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.210–.212 (2003); Ways and Means, supra 
note 2, at 102–03. 
52 A sufªciency of petition, preliminary determination, and ªnal determination. See 
Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 105–09. 
53 A preliminary determination and a ªnal determination. See id. 
54 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(c)(3), 1673b(a); 19 C.F.R. § 351.207(d) (2003). 
55 See USITC Handbook, supra note 21, II-5 to -24. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See id.; McGee, supra note 6, at 499. 
59 See McGee, supra note 6, at 499. 
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imposes the highest possible dumping margins.60 Dumping margins, 
also referred to as AD duties, “equal the amount by which the normal 
value of a good (i.e., the price in the foreign market) exceeds the ex-
port price (i.e., U.S. price) for the merchandise.”61
 If an afªrmative determination of dumping is found, company 
speciªc tariffs are assessed against the defendant companies in the 
amount of the dumping margin.62 If the case is against an entire indus-
try, but the case is determined upon representative companies, then an 
“all others” rate is created for the remainder of the companies from 
that industry in the defendant country.63 Two years after the initial ap-
plication of tariffs, any party to the original case (domestic or interna-
tional) can request an administrative review of the tariff amounts for 
any companies in the defendant industry.64 This request initiates a de 
novo evaluation of the dumping margin, and if it is found to be differ-
ent for the time period in question, it is then adjusted accordingly.65
B. The Salmon Case 
 In June of 1997, eight U.S. salmon farmers ªled an antidumping 
petition with the ITC and DOC alleging “that imports of fresh Atlantic 
salmon from Chile [were] being, or [were] likely to be, sold in the 
United States at less than fair value . . . and that such imports [were] 
materially injuring, or threatening material injury to, a U.S. industry.”66 
On the basis of the petition, the DOC found that there was the possibil-
ity of sales of salmon from Chile in the United States at LTFV.67
 After issuing afªrmative initial determinations, both the ITC and 
DOC performed independent investigations into the salmon market in 
the United States and Chile in order to establish whether there was a 
price difference and if that difference was materially injuring the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. 
61 Ways and Means, supra note 2, at 102–03. 
62 19 U.S.C. § 1673e (1999). 
63 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(b)(3), 1673d(c)(5); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 2664, 2671 (Dept. of Commerce Jan. 16, 1998) (preliminary determination). The Tariff 
Act directs the department to exclude all zero and de minimis margins from the calculation of 
the “all others” rate. See id. The all others rate is determined by taking the weighted average 
of all dumping margins for the represented companies which are not zero or under 0.5% (de 
minimus). See id. 
64 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1999); 19 C.F.R. § 351.213 (2003). 
65 Id. 
66 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 62 Fed. Reg. 37027, 37027 (Dep’t of Commerce 
July 10, 1997) (initiation). 
67 Id. at 37029. 
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market.68 The investigation included a selection of defendants by the 
DOC69 and issuance of initial and supplemental antidumping question-
naires, in English, to each named defendant.70 In its preliminary de-
termination, the DOC published dumping margins based on the best 
(but not all) information available,71 and six months later, after site vis-
its, hearings, and further investigations, in its ªnal determination the 
DOC published the ªnal dumping margins/tariff levels against the 
Chilean defendants.72 Soon after, ITC conªrmed its preliminary deci-
sion that the dumping margins were materially injuring the U.S. mar-
ket.73
 Directly following the ªnal determination, the Association ªled 
allegations that the DOC had made ministerial errors in its ªnal de-
termination.74 The DOC determined that errors were made and ad-
justed the dumping margins.75 The ªnal margins for the case for the 
ªve named defendants were 0.16%, 1.36%, 2.23%, 5.44%, and 10.69%, 
with the “all others” rate at 4.57%.76
 After a ªnal determination has been issued in an AD, companies 
represented in the case may ªle a request for an Administrative Re-
view of the original decision.77 Between 2000 and 2002,78 the U.S. At-
lantic Salmon industry petitioned for Administrative Reviews for spe-
ciªc companies under the ªnal dumping margins.79 In all but two 
                                                                                                                      
68 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2664 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 
16, 1998) (preliminary determination). 
69 Id. at 2664–65. The law requires that an individual dumping margin for each com-
pany be calculated by the DOC. See Id. at 2666. FAST alleged that the entire Chilean 
salmon industry was dumping its products in the US, in order to perform its investigation 
within the statutory time allowed, the DOC limited its investigation to the ªve produc-
ers/exporters of the greatest export volume. Id. 
70 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 2264, 2665 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 
16, 1998) (preliminary determination). 
71 Id. at 2671. 
72 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 31411, 31411 (Dep’t of Commerce 
June 9, 1998)(ªnal determination). The rates were to 0.21%, 0.24%, 1.36%, 8.27%, and 
10.91%, the all others rate was 5.19%. Id. at 31437. 
73 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 40699, 40700 (Dep’t of Commerce 
July 30, 1998) (amend. ªnal determination). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a). 
78 The only years eligible for Administrative Reviews after the statutory delay and be-
fore the required sunset review. See id. 
79 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 65 Fed. Reg. 48457, 48457 (Dep’t of Commerce 
Aug. 8, 2000) (preliminary results administrative review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from 
Chile, 66 Fed. Reg. 18431, 18432 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 9, 2001) (preliminary results 
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cases, the review discovered a zero or de minimis dumping margin, 
with the two remaining margins at only 1.46% and 3.94%.80 All ªve of 
the original defendant companies were found to have de minimis mar-
gins in at least one of the Administrative reviews.81
 When the decision in the Salmon Case came up for its sunset re-
view in 2003, the domestic interested parties who originally ªled the 
dumping petition “expressed no interest in the continuation” of tar-
iffs against the Chilean companies, and as a result all remaining tariffs 
were eliminated.82 In essence, the 1998 AD petition was no longer 
providing any protection to the U.S. ªshing industry because the 
DOC had for the past three years consistently found zero or de minimis 
dumping margins for Chilean exporters.83
C. How the Salmon Case Compares to Other AD Cases 
 When compared with most AD cases, dumping margins at all points 
in the Salmon Case seem insigniªcant.84 In 1990, FAST ªled a petition 
with the DOC and ITC accusing Norway of dumping fresh and chilled 
Atlantic Salmon in the United States.85 In that case, ªnal dumping mar-
gins were determined to be between 18.39% and 31.81% with an “all 
others” rate of 23.80% (over ªve times that of the Salmon Case).86
                                                                                                                      
administrative review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 67 Fed. Reg. 51182, 51182 
(Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 7, 2002) (preliminary results administrative review). 
80 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 65 Fed. Reg. 78472, 78473 (Dep’t of Commerce 
Dec. 15, 2000) (ªnal results administrative review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 66 
Fed. Reg. 42505, 42505 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 13, 2001) (ªnal results administrative 
review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 68 Fed. Reg. 6878, 6879 (Dep’t of Commerce 
Feb. 11, 2003) (ªnal results administrative review). 
81 See id. 
82 Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 68 Fed. Reg. 51593, 51593 (Dep’t of Commerce 
Aug. 27, 2003). 
83 See Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 65 Fed. Reg. 78472, 78473 (Dept’ of Com-
merce Dec. 15, 2000) (ªnal administrative review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 66 
Fed. Reg. 4205, 4205 (Dep’t. of Commerce Aug. 13, 2001) (ªnal results administrative 
review); Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 68 Fed. Reg. 6878, 6879 (Dep’t of Commerce 
Feb. 11. 2003) (ªnal results administrative review). 
84 See, e.g., Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 56 Fed. Reg. 7661 (Dep’t 
of Commerce Feb. 25, 1991); Saccharin from the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 
27530 (May 20, 2003); Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 
68 Fed. Reg. 47909 (Aug. 12, 2003). 
85 Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 55 Fed. Reg. 11418, 11418 (Dep’t 
of Commerce Mar. 28, 1990) (initiation). 
86 Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 56 Fed. Reg. 7661, 7677 (Dep’t of 
Commerce Feb. 25, 1991) (ªnal determination). 
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 In a comparable case, decided in August of 2003, tariff rates of 
36.84% to 63.88% were imposed on frozen ªsh ªllets from Vietnam.87 
These margins are large, but they are nowhere near the top levels of 
AD margins/tariff levels set by the DOC.88 For example, in May of 
2003, dumping margins of 249.39% to 329.33% were imposed against 
saccharin from the People’s Republic of China.89
 It should also be noted that all DOC and ITC determinations are 
based on valuation of products in U.S. Dollars.90 As a result of the price 
conversion from, for example, pesos to dollars, any shifts in exchange 
rates can cause a company to be liable for dumping.91 This is due to the 
system of ºoating exchange rates which allows for exchange rates to 
vary on a daily basis.92 Consequently, through no fault of its own, a for-
eign exporter can be found to have dumped if exchange rates shift in 
the wrong direction; this is especially true for companies based in 
countries whose currency suffers frequent devaluation.93
III. Analysis: Shifting Costs Would Drastically  
Decrease Protectionism 
 U.S. AD law enables U.S. industries to legally protect themselves 
against foreign competition.94 The actual process allows for the ulti-
mate decision maker, a representative of the government of the peti-
tioner, to burden defendants with enormous discovery requests, pre-
scribe the time the defendants have to fulªll the request, and require 
the defendants to submit responses in English, normally their non-
native language.95 As a result, most defendants immediately must seek 
expensive U.S. counsel to handle their defense (the Salmon Case cost 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 68 Fed. Reg. 
4709, 4709-10 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 12, 2003)(ªnal determination). 
88 See e.g., Saccharin from the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 27530, 27533 
(Dep’t of Commerce May 20, 2003)(ªnal determination). 
89 Id. 
90 See McGee, supra note 6, at 501–04. 
91 See McGee & Yoon, supra note 3, at 273–74. 
92 See id. at 274; see also generally N. David Palmeter, Exchange rates and Antidumping De-
terminations, 22 J. World Trade 73 (1988). 
93 See generally Palmeter, supra note 92. Further, the DOC’s preferred source for daily 
exchange rates is the Federal Reserve Bank, but not all countries’ currencies are carried 
on that system. See Fresh Atlantic Salmon From Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2671 (Dep’t of 
Commerce Jan. 16, 1998) (preliminary determination). For example, daily exchange rates 
for Chilean pesos are not carried by the Federal Reserve. See id. 
94 See McGee & Yoon, supra note 3, at 260. 
95 See McGee, supra note 6, at 496. 
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Chilean exporters over $12 million in legal fees96), while the peti-
tioner is allowed to rely on the DOC and ITC to cover any costs of 
proceeding with the investigation.97 In essence, the AD laws replace 
the United State’s traditional adversarial system of justice with one 
that is inquisitorial.98
 AD laws protect domestic producers at the expense of citizens in 
both the United States and the accused country because competition 
decreases.99 Domestically, prices are necessarily higher for products 
protected by AD tariffs.100 Even more dramatic are the costs to the 
U.S. economy as a whole.101 A 1995 ITC report concluded that the 
cost to the U.S. economy of antidumping measures was signiªcantly 
higher than the beneªt to the protected industry.102
 Similarly, in the accused country, exports decrease and companies 
are required to spend time and resources on defending themselves 
against the charges, instead of focusing on research, development, or 
company expansion, which ultimately harms the economy.103 Addition-
ally, there are social costs that accompany restrictions on trade, for ex-
ample loss of jobs, slower industry growth, and negative feelings and 
opinions toward the United States.104 In Chile, the Salmon Case was 
called “a thorn in Chile’s side” which had “the makings of another bit-
ter grudge for Chile against its top trade partner.”105
 Conversely, the only ªnancial costs faced by the petitioners in an 
AD case, as stated previously, are those associated with preparing and 
ªling the petition.106 Moreover, if AD tariffs are imposed, the petition-
ing industry can receive huge ªnancial and market beneªts even 
though the U.S. economy as a whole may suffer.107 A simple cost-
beneªt analysis reveals that there is little to lose and a great deal to gain 
                                                                                                                      
96 Grape Exporters Pleased with Dumping Decision but Say the Battle Isn’t over Yet, Santiago 
Times, June 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5995737. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See McGee, supra note 6, at 491, 535–40, 559–60. 
100 See id. By imposing tariffs on imported products, those tariffs are directly passed 
onto the consumer in the form of price increases. See id. 
101 See McGee, supra note 6, at 535–40. 
102 Corr, supra note 4, at 100. 
103 See id. at 100–01; McGee, supra note 6, at 540. 
104 See McGee, supra note 6, at 491, 535–40. 
105 Chilean Salmon in Hot Water U.S. Department of Commerce Finds Industry Guilty of Dump-
ing, CHIP News, Source: World Reporter, June 3, 1998, available at 1998 WL 8626620. 
106 See McGee, supra note 6, at 536. 
107 See Corr, supra note 4, at 101; McGee & Yoon, supra note 3, at 278. 
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for any single U.S. industry that can provide documentation which al-
leges dumping.108
 In much the same way that the increased costs of an AD case 
cause foreign exporters to limit or eliminate their exports to the 
United States, if petitioners in AD cases had to pay the costs of inves-
tigating and hearing the cases, the total costs for the domestic indus-
try would increase, and the resulting number of frivolous cases would 
decrease.109 Simple economics of supply and demand support the 
contention that as prices for goods or services increase,110 demand 
decreases.111 The same cost-beneªt analysis applies here, and the re-
sulting considerations for the use of AD laws would be drastically 
changed for companies facing potentially very high discovery costs.112
 It logically follows that, if costs were redistributed, AD cases 
would only be brought by companies who are facing real cases of 
dumping rather than those who are merely facing increased foreign 
competition.113 For example, FAST may have felt it necessary to seek 
protection against Norwegian competitors who were selling their 
products at a 30% dumping level, but would probably have seriously 
considered whether the beneªts of a determination of a tariff at less 
than 5%, as was true in the Salmon Case, would have outweighed the 
costs of the AD investigation process.114
Conclusion: Shifting Costs—Little to Lose, Much to Gain 
 A change in cost distribution in AD cases would not only beneªt 
many developing economies by eliminating most, if not all, of the pro-
tectionist AD cases brought in the United States, but it would also lead 
to more competition and a more efªcient U.S. market.115 As the cur-
rent law stands, approximately half the antidumping petitions that are 
ªled with the DOC and ITC do not end in dumping margins.116 In 
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many other cases, including the Salmon Case, the dumping margins 
are small and on Administrative Review are revised to be zero or de 
minimis.117 In the Salmon Case, the parties who originally ªled the 
petition had no interest in continuing the resulting margins when it 
came up for its sunset review. In essence, they had gotten the majority 
of the protectionist beneªts of the law while Chilean exporters faced 
the yearly burden of denying the accusations. By redistributing costs 
to petitioners, cases like the Salmon Case would become economically 
inefªcient for companies to ªle, and the beneªts of the lower number 
of cases would be felt by both countries. AD laws would only be used 
when there is real need for protection against foreign companies in-
tending to sell their products below fair market value and the likeli-
hood of harm to the United States arises. 
                                                                                                                      
117 See, e.g., Fresh Atlantic Salmon from Chile, 65 Fed. Reg. 78472, 78473 (Dep’t of 
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